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<prism:eIssn>1744-6406</prism:eIssn>
<prism:coverDisplayDate>June 2008</prism:coverDisplayDate>
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<title><![CDATA[Idealization in Cassirer's Philosophy of Mathematics]]></title>
<link>http://philmat.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/short/16/2/151?rss=1</link>
<description><![CDATA[
<p>The notion of idealization has received considerable attention in contemporary philosophy of science but less in philosophy of mathematics. An exception was the &lsquo;critical idealism&rsquo; of the neo-Kantian philosopher Ernst Cassirer. According to Cassirer the methodology of idealization plays a central role for mathematics <I>and</I> empirical science. In this paper it is argued that Cassirer's contributions in this area still deserve to be taken into account in the current debates in philosophy of mathematics.</p>
]]></description>
<dc:creator><![CDATA[Mormann, T.]]></dc:creator>
<dc:date>2008-06-02</dc:date>
<dc:identifier>info:doi/10.1093/philmat/nkm038</dc:identifier>
<dc:title><![CDATA[Idealization in Cassirer's Philosophy of Mathematics]]></dc:title>
<dc:publisher>Oxford University Press</dc:publisher>
<prism:number>2</prism:number>
<prism:volume>16</prism:volume>
<prism:endingPage>181</prism:endingPage>
<prism:publicationDate>2008-06-01</prism:publicationDate>
<prism:startingPage>151</prism:startingPage>
<prism:section>Articles</prism:section>
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<title><![CDATA[Abstraction and Additional Nature]]></title>
<link>http://philmat.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/short/16/2/182?rss=1</link>
<description><![CDATA[
<p>In &lsquo;What is wrong with abstraction&rsquo;, Michael Potter and Peter Sullivan explain a further objection to the abstractionist programme in the foundations of mathematics which they first presented in their &lsquo;Hale on Caesar&rsquo; and which they believe our discussion in <I>The Reason's Proper Study</I> misunderstood. The aims of the present note are: <l type="ord"><li><p>To get the character of this objection into sharper focus;</p>
</li><li>
<p>To explore further certain of the assumptions&mdash;primarily, about reference-fixing in mathematics, about certain putative limitations of abstractionist set theory, and about the effects of impredicativity in abstraction principles&mdash;which underlie it; and</p>
</li><li>
<p>To advance the debate of the issues thereby raised.</p>
</li></l> </p>]]></description>
<dc:creator><![CDATA[Hale, B., Wright, C.]]></dc:creator>
<dc:date>2008-06-02</dc:date>
<dc:identifier>info:doi/10.1093/philmat/nkm036</dc:identifier>
<dc:title><![CDATA[Abstraction and Additional Nature]]></dc:title>
<dc:publisher>Oxford University Press</dc:publisher>
<prism:number>2</prism:number>
<prism:volume>16</prism:volume>
<prism:endingPage>208</prism:endingPage>
<prism:publicationDate>2008-06-01</prism:publicationDate>
<prism:startingPage>182</prism:startingPage>
<prism:section>Articles</prism:section>
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<title><![CDATA[A Puzzle About Ontological Commitments]]></title>
<link>http://philmat.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/short/16/2/209?rss=1</link>
<description><![CDATA[
<p>This paper raises and then discusses a puzzle concerning the ontological commitments of mathematical principles. The main focus here is Hume's Principle&mdash;a statement that, embedded in second-order logic, allows for a deduction of the second-order Peano axioms. The puzzle aims to put pressure on so-called epistemic rejectionism, a position that rejects the analytic status of Hume's Principle. The upshot will be to elicit a new and very basic disagreement between epistemic rejectionism and the neo-Fregeans, defenders of the analytic status of Hume's Principle, which will provide a new angle from which properly to assess and re-evaluate the current debate.</p>
]]></description>
<dc:creator><![CDATA[Ebert, P. A.]]></dc:creator>
<dc:date>2008-06-02</dc:date>
<dc:identifier>info:doi/10.1093/philmat/nkm050</dc:identifier>
<dc:title><![CDATA[A Puzzle About Ontological Commitments]]></dc:title>
<dc:publisher>Oxford University Press</dc:publisher>
<prism:number>2</prism:number>
<prism:volume>16</prism:volume>
<prism:endingPage>226</prism:endingPage>
<prism:publicationDate>2008-06-01</prism:publicationDate>
<prism:startingPage>209</prism:startingPage>
<prism:section>Articles</prism:section>
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<title><![CDATA[The Explanatory Power of Phase Spaces]]></title>
<link>http://philmat.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/short/16/2/227?rss=1</link>
<description><![CDATA[
<p>David Malament argued that Hartry Field's nominalisation program is unlikely to be able to deal with non-space-time theories such as phase-space theories. We give a specific example of such a phase-space theory and argue that this presentation of the theory delivers explanations that are not available in the classical presentation of the theory. This suggests that even if phase-space theories can be nominalised, the resulting theory will not have the explanatory power of the original. Phase-space theories thus raise problems for nominalists that go beyond Malament's initial concerns.</p>
]]></description>
<dc:creator><![CDATA[Lyon, A., Colyvan, M.]]></dc:creator>
<dc:date>2008-06-02</dc:date>
<dc:identifier>info:doi/10.1093/philmat/nkm025</dc:identifier>
<dc:title><![CDATA[The Explanatory Power of Phase Spaces]]></dc:title>
<dc:publisher>Oxford University Press</dc:publisher>
<prism:number>2</prism:number>
<prism:volume>16</prism:volume>
<prism:endingPage>243</prism:endingPage>
<prism:publicationDate>2008-06-01</prism:publicationDate>
<prism:startingPage>227</prism:startingPage>
<prism:section>Articles</prism:section>
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<title><![CDATA[Multiple Reductions Revisited]]></title>
<link>http://philmat.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/short/16/2/244?rss=1</link>
<description><![CDATA[
<p>Paul Benacerraf's argument from multiple reductions consists of a general argument against realism about the natural numbers (the view that numbers are objects), and a limited argument against reductionism about them (the view that numbers are identical with <I>prima facie</I> distinct entities). There is a widely recognized and severe difficulty with the former argument, but no comparably recognized such difficulty with the latter. Even so, reductionism in mathematics continues to thrive. In this paper I develop a difficulty for Benacerraf's argument against reductionism that is of comparable severity to the now widely recognized difficulty with his general argument against realism.</p>
]]></description>
<dc:creator><![CDATA[Clarke-Doane, J.]]></dc:creator>
<dc:date>2008-06-02</dc:date>
<dc:identifier>info:doi/10.1093/philmat/nkm034</dc:identifier>
<dc:title><![CDATA[Multiple Reductions Revisited]]></dc:title>
<dc:publisher>Oxford University Press</dc:publisher>
<prism:number>2</prism:number>
<prism:volume>16</prism:volume>
<prism:endingPage>255</prism:endingPage>
<prism:publicationDate>2008-06-01</prism:publicationDate>
<prism:startingPage>244</prism:startingPage>
<prism:section>Discussion note</prism:section>
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<title><![CDATA[NATHANIEL MILLER. Euclid and his Twentieth Century Rivals: Diagrams in the Logic of Euclidean Geometry. CSLI Studies in the Theory and Applications of Diagrams]]></title>
<link>http://philmat.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/short/16/2/256?rss=1</link>
<description><![CDATA[]]></description>
<dc:creator><![CDATA[Mumma, J.]]></dc:creator>
<dc:date>2008-06-02</dc:date>
<dc:identifier>info:doi/10.1093/philmat/nkn003</dc:identifier>
<dc:title><![CDATA[NATHANIEL MILLER. Euclid and his Twentieth Century Rivals: Diagrams in the Logic of Euclidean Geometry. CSLI Studies in the Theory and Applications of Diagrams]]></dc:title>
<dc:publisher>Oxford University Press</dc:publisher>
<prism:number>2</prism:number>
<prism:volume>16</prism:volume>
<prism:endingPage>264</prism:endingPage>
<prism:publicationDate>2008-06-01</prism:publicationDate>
<prism:startingPage>256</prism:startingPage>
<prism:section>Critical Studies/Book Reviews</prism:section>
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<title><![CDATA[RICHARD TIESZEN. Phenomenology, Logic, and the Philosophy of Mathematics]]></title>
<link>http://philmat.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/short/16/2/264?rss=1</link>
<description><![CDATA[]]></description>
<dc:creator><![CDATA[Ronzitti, G.]]></dc:creator>
<dc:date>2008-06-02</dc:date>
<dc:identifier>info:doi/10.1093/philmat/nkm041</dc:identifier>
<dc:title><![CDATA[RICHARD TIESZEN. Phenomenology, Logic, and the Philosophy of Mathematics]]></dc:title>
<dc:publisher>Oxford University Press</dc:publisher>
<prism:number>2</prism:number>
<prism:volume>16</prism:volume>
<prism:endingPage>276</prism:endingPage>
<prism:publicationDate>2008-06-01</prism:publicationDate>
<prism:startingPage>264</prism:startingPage>
<prism:section>Critical Studies/Book Reviews</prism:section>
</item>

<item rdf:about="http://philmat.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/short/16/2/276?rss=1">
<title><![CDATA[MARK VAN ATTEN. Brouwer meets Husserl: On the Phenomenology of Choice Sequences]]></title>
<link>http://philmat.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/short/16/2/276?rss=1</link>
<description><![CDATA[]]></description>
<dc:creator><![CDATA[Franchella, M.]]></dc:creator>
<dc:date>2008-06-02</dc:date>
<dc:identifier>info:doi/10.1093/philmat/nkm040</dc:identifier>
<dc:title><![CDATA[MARK VAN ATTEN. Brouwer meets Husserl: On the Phenomenology of Choice Sequences]]></dc:title>
<dc:publisher>Oxford University Press</dc:publisher>
<prism:number>2</prism:number>
<prism:volume>16</prism:volume>
<prism:endingPage>281</prism:endingPage>
<prism:publicationDate>2008-06-01</prism:publicationDate>
<prism:startingPage>276</prism:startingPage>
<prism:section>Critical Studies/Book Reviews</prism:section>
</item>

<item rdf:about="http://philmat.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/short/16/2/282?rss=1">
<title><![CDATA[PETR HAJEK, LUIS VALDES-VILLANUEVA, and DAG WESTERSTAHL, eds. Logic, Methodology and Philosophy of Science: Proceedings of the Twelfth International Congress [2003]]]></title>
<link>http://philmat.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/short/16/2/282?rss=1</link>
<description><![CDATA[]]></description>
<dc:creator><![CDATA[]]></dc:creator>
<dc:date>2008-06-02</dc:date>
<dc:identifier>info:doi/10.1093/philmat/nkn004</dc:identifier>
<dc:title><![CDATA[PETR HAJEK, LUIS VALDES-VILLANUEVA, and DAG WESTERSTAHL, eds. Logic, Methodology and Philosophy of Science: Proceedings of the Twelfth International Congress [2003]]]></dc:title>
<dc:publisher>Oxford University Press</dc:publisher>
<prism:number>2</prism:number>
<prism:volume>16</prism:volume>
<prism:endingPage>283</prism:endingPage>
<prism:publicationDate>2008-06-01</prism:publicationDate>
<prism:startingPage>282</prism:startingPage>
<prism:section>Books of Essays</prism:section>
</item>

<item rdf:about="http://philmat.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/short/16/2/282-a?rss=1">
<title><![CDATA[MARY LENG, ALEXANDER PASEAU, and MICHAEL POTTER, eds. Mathematical Knowledge]]></title>
<link>http://philmat.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/short/16/2/282-a?rss=1</link>
<description><![CDATA[]]></description>
<dc:creator><![CDATA[]]></dc:creator>
<dc:date>2008-06-02</dc:date>
<dc:identifier>info:doi/10.1093/philmat/nkn009</dc:identifier>
<dc:title><![CDATA[MARY LENG, ALEXANDER PASEAU, and MICHAEL POTTER, eds. Mathematical Knowledge]]></dc:title>
<dc:publisher>Oxford University Press</dc:publisher>
<prism:number>2</prism:number>
<prism:volume>16</prism:volume>
<prism:endingPage>282</prism:endingPage>
<prism:publicationDate>2008-06-01</prism:publicationDate>
<prism:startingPage>282</prism:startingPage>
<prism:section>Books of Essays</prism:section>
</item>

<item rdf:about="http://philmat.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/short/16/2/284?rss=1">
<title><![CDATA[JOHAN VAN BENTHEM, GERHARD HEINZMANN, MANUEL REBUSCHI, and HENK VISSER, eds. The Age of Alternative Logics: Assessing Philosophy of Logic and Mathematics Today. Logic, Epistemology, and the Unity of Science; 3]]></title>
<link>http://philmat.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/short/16/2/284?rss=1</link>
<description><![CDATA[]]></description>
<dc:creator><![CDATA[]]></dc:creator>
<dc:date>2008-06-02</dc:date>
<dc:identifier>info:doi/10.1093/philmat/nkn005</dc:identifier>
<dc:title><![CDATA[JOHAN VAN BENTHEM, GERHARD HEINZMANN, MANUEL REBUSCHI, and HENK VISSER, eds. The Age of Alternative Logics: Assessing Philosophy of Logic and Mathematics Today. Logic, Epistemology, and the Unity of Science; 3]]></dc:title>
<dc:publisher>Oxford University Press</dc:publisher>
<prism:number>2</prism:number>
<prism:volume>16</prism:volume>
<prism:endingPage>284</prism:endingPage>
<prism:publicationDate>2008-06-01</prism:publicationDate>
<prism:startingPage>284</prism:startingPage>
<prism:section>Books of Essays</prism:section>
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